Understanding threat actor capabilities is only half the battle—the other half is knowing whether your organization is in their crosshairs. See how Bitsight threat intelligence helps you move from observation to action.
TeamPCP-related activity increased by 471% in the last month compared to similar groups, according to Bitsight Threat Intelligence. Recent reporting connects TeamPCP to Vect, an emerging ransomware-as-a-service operation, and links the group to compromised developer and security tools including Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx Python SDK. The FBI FLASH also lists SANDCLOCK, Mini Shai-Hulud, and Miasma as malware used by TeamPCP. Public reporting has also connected TeamPCP to claims involving thousands of GitHub internal repositories, a malicious Visual Studio Code extension, and the xinference PyPI hijack involving stolen cloud credentials, SSH keys, and .env secrets.
Compromised open-source packages
Compromised developer tools
Malicious VS Code extensions
Compromised GitHub repositories
Compromised CI/CD workflows
Stolen package publishing credentials
Stolen cloud credentials
Stolen SSH keys
Exposed Kubernetes credentials
Exposed .env secrets
Compromised npm packages
Compromised PyPI packages
Compromised Docker workflows
Compromised GitHub Actions workflows
Supply Chain Compromise
Subvert Trust Controls
Unsecured Credentials
OS Credential Dumping
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Data Destruction
Create or Modify System Process
Escape to Host
Credential theft
Open-source package compromise
Developer tool compromise
CI/CD pipeline targeting
Package publishing workflow abuse
npm ecosystem abuse
PyPI ecosystem abuse
Malicious VS Code extension usage
Kubernetes lateral movement
Cloud credential harvesting
Repository exfiltration
Sensitive development data exfiltration
Use of stolen credentials to spread across packages or environments
AES-256 encryption during exfiltration
RSA-4096 encryption during exfiltration
Audio steganography
Self-replicating supply chain activity
Social engineering
Ransomware-as-a-service collaboration
TeamPCP is a financially motivated ransomware group tied to software supply chain compromise, credential theft, extortion, and abuse of developer infrastructure.
TeamPCP is tracked through aliases including ShellForce, PCPcat, TeamPCP, DeadCatx3, Altered Spider, and PersyPCP.
TeamPCP has claimed ownership of CipherForce, which it describes as its private locker.
TeamPCP activity focuses on tools developers use every day, including open-source packages, GitHub repositories, CI/CD workflows, VS Code extensions, Kubernetes environments, Docker, npm, PyPI, Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx Python SDK.
Developer environments often contain sensitive access by default, including source code, API keys, SSH keys, cloud tokens, Kubernetes secrets, package publishing credentials, and build-system permissions.
TeamPCP-related activity increased by 471% in the last month compared to similar groups, according to Bitsight Threat Intelligence.
TeamPCP activity aligns with a broader cybercrime shift upstream into the software development process, where attackers target trusted tools, packages, credentials, and workflows used by developers.
TeamPCP is most relevant to organizations that rely heavily on software development infrastructure and third-party code.
A company does not need to be directly targeted by TeamPCP to be exposed if a vendor, package, extension, or dependency is compromised.
Recent reporting connects TeamPCP to Vect, an emerging ransomware-as-a-service operation.
TeamPCP access from supply chain compromise and stolen credentials could help feed Vect ransomware deployment and extortion activity.
TeamPCP has been linked to compromised developer and security tools, including Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx Python SDK.
TeamPCP has used credential-stealing malware to harvest secrets from developer and cloud environments, including SSH keys, Kubernetes credentials, cloud tokens, .env files, package publishing credentials, and other access that can help attackers move deeper into an environment.
The FBI FLASH lists SANDCLOCK, Mini Shai-Hulud, and Miasma as malware used by TeamPCP.
SANDCLOCK is described as a credential-stealing tool.
Mini Shai-Hulud and Miasma are tied to self-replicating supply chain activity across npm and PyPI.
Public reporting linked claims around thousands of GitHub internal repositories to a malicious Visual Studio Code extension installed by a GitHub employee.
GitHub reportedly contained the incident, removed affected extensions, isolated the device, and rotated critical secrets.
Recent social media activity shows TeamPCP's name being used in connection with the xinference PyPI hijack, where reporting referenced stolen cloud credentials, SSH keys, and .env secrets.
TeamPCP and Vect are now reported to be working together, connecting software supply chain access with ransomware deployment and extortion.
Vect's encryptor has reportedly had serious coding flaws that can corrupt files larger than 128 KB in a way that makes recovery impossible, even if a victim pays and receives a key.
Earlier TeamPCP messaging tried to separate CipherForce from Vect's encryption issues, but newer reporting indicates the two groups are now working together.
TeamPCP-related activity maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques including T1611, T1003, T1553, T1552, T1567, T1485, T1543, and T1195.
TeamPCP-style attacks often start with something that looks legitimate, such as a trusted package, VS Code extension, build workflow, or developer credential.
CI/CD environments are especially high risk because build systems often have access to secrets, deployment workflows, repositories, and production-adjacent infrastructure.
TeamPCP shows how software supply chain compromise can become a business risk by exposing code, secrets, cloud infrastructure, customers, vendors, and downstream users.
Treat developer tooling as part of the attack surface
Restrict unapproved IDE extensions
Review installed VS Code extensions
Enforce least privilege for GitHub, npm, PyPI, Docker, and CI/CD credentials
Rotate credentials after suspected compromise
Scan repositories for hardcoded secrets
Monitor package updates for suspicious behavior
Use approved dependency lists or internal package mirrors
Harden Kubernetes access
Audit Kubernetes cluster secrets
Monitor dark web, paste, ransomware, and code repository sources for leaked assets
Treat developer workstations, package publishing accounts, and build systems as sensitive infrastructure
Maintain clean, disconnected backups to reduce risk from flawed ransomware encryption or unrecoverable data corruption
Understanding threat actor capabilities is only half the battle—the other half is knowing whether your organization is in their crosshairs. See how Bitsight threat intelligence helps you move from observation to action.